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THE DECLINE OF EDIBLE EQUINE: A COMMENT ON CAVEL
INTERNATIONAL INC. V. MADIGAN
BRADLEY J. SAYLES*
I. INTRODUCTION
The horse is an iconic symbol that holds a special place in the
hearts of many Americans. Not only is the animal an athlete racing for
glory in the sport of kings, but the horse has carried American soldiers into
war and American cowboys into the west. Ironically, at a time when the
Lone Ranger called out to his trusty steed Silver on television sets and
radios, the horse found its way on to the American kitchen table. Following
World War II, beef prices skyrocketed and some Americans began to
purchase cheaper and leaner horse meat.' Although horse meat never
became a staple of the mainstream American diet, it still found its way onto
several menus. For example, the Harvard Faculty Club served horse meat
it obtained from the nearby Suffolk Downs racetrack until 1985 and it was
only removed when the newly hired French chef refused to prepare it.2
While the consumption of horse meat remains legal in the United
States, currently there exists no market for it. However, several European
and Asian countries eat the meat regularly.3 In 2006 America was the fifth
largest exporter of edible equine, shipping over 26 million pounds of horse
meat and generating $40 million in sales.4 This is even more amazing
given the fact that only three slaughterhouses butchered horses for human
consumption in 2006. 5  Two of those companies maintained
slaughterhouses in Texas, but were forced to cease operations in 2007 when
the Fifth Circuit upheld legislation outlawing the practice.6 This left Cavel
International (hereinafter "Cavel"), as the sole exporter of edible equine in
the United States. Cavel's primacy was short-lived, however, as Illinois
quickly followed Texas's lead and passed an amendment to the Illinois
*Notes Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2009-2010. B.A. 2005, Northern Kentucky University, M.P.A. 2007 Northern Kentucky
University, J.D. expected May 2010, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1 See Manners and Morals: Horse of a Different Flavor, TIME, July 9, 1951, at 17 (Article
provides tips for preparing horse meat).
2 History of the Harvard Faculty Club, http://www.hfc.harvard.edu/about history.html (last
visited Aug. 26, 2009). The newly hired chef refused to prepare the horse meat because it was frozen.
3 See Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551,552 (7th Cir. 2007).
4 Tony Dokoupil, They Shoot Horses, Don't They?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2007, at 86, 87.
5id.
6 Empacadora de Carries de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V., v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir.
2007).
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Horse Meat Act, which made it illegal to butcher horses for human
consumption.
In Cavel International Inc. v. Madigan, Cavel challenged the
constitutionality of the Illinois amendment on two grounds: claiming, first,
that the Illinois amendment was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection
Act and, second, that the amendment unduly interfered with U.S. foreign
commerce and therefore violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. This
Comment examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's
approach to removing the Cavel slaughterhouse and the issues surrounding
that approach.
Section II of this Comment provides the legal background
controlling the issues in question, including an examination of the Illinois
Horse Meat Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, and Article I, § 8, clause
3 of the Federal Constitution. Section III discuses the background and the
procedural history of the case. Section IV addresses the claims put forth by
Cavel, the Seventh Circuit's discussion of the issues in the case, and the
court's holding. Finally, section V explains the implications of the holding
and the impact the decision had on both Cavel and the horse meat industry
as a whole.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Illinois Horse Meat Act
On May 24, 2007, the Illinois Horse Meat Act was amended to
include section 1.5 which states that slaughter for human consumption is
unlawful:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is
unlawful for any person to slaughter a horse if that person
knows or should know that any of the horse meat will be
used for human consumption.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is
unlawful for any person to possess, to import into or export
from this State, or to sell, buy give away, hold, or accept
any horse meat if that person knows or should know that
the horse meat will be used for human consumption.
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(c) Any person who knowingly violates any of the
provisions of this Section is guilty of a Class C
misdemeanor.
The Illinois Legislature went on to provide exceptions by allowing horse
slaughter for the following: "commonly accepted non-commercial
recreational or sporting activities[,] . . . existing laws relate[d] to horse taxes
or zoning," and non-equine food producing animals.
B. Federal Meat Inspection Act
The Federal Meat Inspection Act (hereinafter "FMIA") includes
regulations governing the processing of horse meat when it is used for
human consumption. Section 601 of the FMIA, initially limits its scope to
"any meat or other portion of the carcass of any cattle, sheep, swine, or
goats. . . capable of use as human food."9 However, the section also states
that "equines shall have a meaning comparable to that provided in this
paragraph with respect to cattle, sheep, swine, and goats."' 0 The Act further
provides rules that impact the packing of any meat food product. Section
678 of the FMIA contains a preemption clause that states that
"[r]equirements within the scope of this Act with respect to premises,
facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is
provided under title I of this Act [USCS §§ 601 et seq.], which are in
addition to, or different than those made under this Act may not be imposed
by any State or Territory."
'
"I
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Federal Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 2 Courts have long recognized
that this clause not only delegates to Congress the authority to regulate
interstate or foreign commerce, but prevents state and local laws from
placing an undue burden on that commerce.' 3 There are two predominate
ways a state can impede upon Congress' commerce power: first, a state can
create a law that clearly discriminates in favor of local citizens or, second, a
7 Illinois Horse Meat Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 635/1.5 (2007).8Id.
9 21 U.S.C. § 6010) (2006).
10 Id.
21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006).
12 U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 3.
13 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-25 (1978); see also Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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state can create a law that is nondiscriminatory and treats all citizens
equally, but still imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. 14 If the
law is discriminatory, the Court applies the strict scrutiny test which only
upholds the state law if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest.15 In contrast, nondiscriminatory statutes are given more favorable
treatment with the Court, balancing the burden on the interstate and foreign
commerce against the local state interest and putative benefit.
16
Whether discriminatory or not, when a state passes legislation that
places a burden on foreign commerce it is subject to further review. The
need to have a single unified voice when trading with foreign nations has
made foreign commerce "pre-eminently a matter of national concern.'' 7
The burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to demonstrate that the state law
interferes with foreign commerce.
18
III. CASE HISTORY
In the last 20 years, Cavel has participated in horse slaughter and
recently stood as the last remaining U.S. slaughterhouse in the business.' 9
The facility was located in the small college town of Dekalb, Illinois, near
Chicago.2 ° It employed over 60 workers that slaughtered 40,000 to 60,000
horses a year with an estimated $20 million in annual revenues.2 1 Brokers
obtained the horses at auction and sold them to Cavel for around $300 a
horse.22 Although the facility was located in the U.S., Cavel's entire output
23
was exported to European and Asian markets.
Prior to May 24, 2007, the Illinois Horse Meat Act governed the
licensing, inspecting, and labeling of horse meat slaughtered within the
state.24 The May 24 amendment put an end to the practice altogether by
making it illegal for a person "to slaughter a horse if that person knows or
should know that any of the horse meat will be used for human
consumption. 25 Soon after the Illinois Horse Meat Act's enactment "Cavel
moved for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
14 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-25; see also Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
"5 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951).
,6 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
17 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
" Id.; see also Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-28 (1994); Bd.
of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933).
'9 Cavel Int'l Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2007).
20 Id.
21 id.
2 id.
23Id. at 553.
24 id.
25 Id.
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amendment., 26 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
that Cavel failed to show that its claims were likely to ultimately prevail on
the merits and denied the request.27 Cavel appealed to the Seventh Circuit
which granted a preliminary injunction pending its decision. 8 The case
was argued on August 16, 2007 and the decision was issued on September
21, 2007.29
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS
A. Holding
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit quickly ruled that amendments
made to the Illinois Horse Meat Act (hereinafter "Amendment") were not
preempted by the FMIA and spent a majority of the decision discussing
whether the state's action was in violation of the Commerce Clause.3 ° First,
the Court found that the Amendment was not discriminatory, and, second,
that the burden imposed on commerce was not clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits, and, finally, that Cavel failed to meet its
burden of proof as to the potential impact on foreign commerce.3'
(1) Federal Meat Inspection Act
Cavel claimed that the Amendment was preempted by the FMIA
which stipulates that any requirements imposed by any state "'in addition
to, or different' from those made under the Act, are void.32 Cavel argued
that the FMIA specifically refers to, and regulates, horse slaughter and
therefore the Amendment is voided because it rendered the federal
requirements inapplicable by disallowing the slaughter of horses.33 The
court stated that the clear intent of the FMIA was the regulation of meat
produced for the purpose of human consumption and, because in years past
horse meat was produced for human consumption in the United States, it
was "natural to make the Act applicable. 34 The Court reasoned that just
because the federal government taxes income from gambling, it does not
follow that all states have to permit gambling. It was clear that the
26 Id.
27 Id.
2 8 
Id.
29 Id. at 551.
30 See id. at 553-54.
" Id. at 555-58.
32Id. at 553 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §678 (2006)).
33 See Id.
'Id. at 553-54.
35 Id. at 554.
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Amendment was not meant to be an addition to the FMIA.36 However, the
Court found that the two laws could co-exist because the Illinois
Amendment was not concerned with inspection, which is the primary
purpose of the FMIA.37 The FMIA is "concerned with inspecting premises
at which meat is produced for human consumption rather than with
preserving the production of particular types of meat for people to eat.
38
(2) Dormant Commerce Clause
Having refuted the preemption argument, the Court addressed
Cavel's claim that the Amendment violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause. In so doing, the Court provided an in-depth discussion of the legal
issues involved.
i. Discrimination
The first step in the court's analysis was to determine whether the
statute discriminated in favor of local citizens. 39 The Court cited several
cases concerning laws with an obvious state-firm bias and noted that these
incidents were the clearest cases of a Commerce Clause violation.4 °
However, discrimination alone does not make a state law unconstitutional.
If the state proves there is no other way to accomplish its legitimate goals
except through discriminatory legislation the law may remain in place.41
42The Seventh Circuit found that in this case there was no discrimination.
The Amendment equally prevented both in-state and out-of-state firms from
slaughtering horses and no local merchant or producer benefited from the
ban on slaughter.43
When a statute is determined to be nondiscriminatory, a high
burden is on the plaintiff and the Court applies the test derived from Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 44 In Pike, the Court held that
when a "statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
' 4 5
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 Id. (citations omitted).
39 See id.
4 id
41 Id.
42 Id. at 559.431 d. at 555.
"Id.
45 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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ii. Balancing the Burden Imposed Against Putative Local
Benefits
Before applying the Pike Test the court noted that in the past it
"expressed doubt that even this tough test is available to plaintiffs unless
they show at least "mild" discrimination against interstate commerce. ' 4 6 At
a minimum, the Pike test requires "'incidental' 'effects on interstate
commerce be shown."'4 7 The court continued on to note that absent any
"discrimination, a burden on interstate commerce that had no rational
justification would be invalid. '48 As an example the court pointed to a
famous Illinois case, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959), which required all semi-trucks to have a particular type of
mudguards. 49 The mudguard law impacted both non-local and local truckers
alike, but because it lacked a rational basis the state law was invalidated,
despite no proof of a disparate impact.5°
Cavel's argument was similar to the one made in Bibb, that the
Amendment served no reasonable purpose.5' Cavel argued that since
horses age, their usefulness wanes and they inevitably die, it makes no
difference whether the horses "are eaten by people or by cats and dogs.,
52
The Court was not persuaded by this line of argument because slaughtering
horses for human consumption is different than slaughtering horses for
other purposes. If horse meat is to be used for human consumption, the
horses must be alive prior to slaughter. Therefore Cavel had to pay for the
horses and their shipment. Factories that produce pet food, however, do not
slaughter the animal but make the product from the carcasses.53
Furthermore, the owner of the deceased horse usually pays to have it
delivered to the rendering plant. 4 The court held that these practices
created an obvious financial benefit to the horse owner willing to sell his
horse for slaughter rather than wait for it to die or have it euthanized and
then pay to have it taken to a rendering plant. It is a logical inference that
many horses die sooner than they naturally would have because of the
practice of horse slaughter for human consumption. 6
4 Cavel, 500 F.3d at 555.
47 Id. (citations omitted).41Id. at 556 (citing Nat'l Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 1d.
52 id.
3 Id. at 553.
54 Id at 556.
5 Id.
'6See id. at 556-57.
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States have a long recognized "legitimate interest in prolonging the
lives of animals that their population happens to like."57 It mattered little to
the court that Illinois could have done more to protect horses because states
are allowed to balance competing interests or to take only small steps in
furtherance of a legitimate goal.5 If the Amendment failed to prolong the
life of even one horse, the state may also have an interest, "within reason, to
express disgust at what people do with the dead, whether dead human
beings or dead animals. 5 9 The court opines that "[t]here would be an
uproar if restaurants in Chicago started serving cat and dog steaks, even
though millions of stray cats and dogs are euthanized in animal shelters."
60
Whether the Amendment was based on the state's interest of prolonging the
life of an animal its population adores, or expressing distaste for human
consumption of horse meat, the court felt there was some rational basis for
the Amendment. Furthermore, the court pointed out that Cavel could have
moved into other markets which use slaughtered horse meat, such as zoos.
61
The statute as written only prohibited slaughtering for human
consumption 62 and therefore Cavel may shift its horse slaughter to serve the
zoo market which uses the meat to feed their carnivorous animals.63
iii. Potential Impact On Foreign Commerce
In this case the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis did not end at
establishing a rational basis for the nondiscriminatory law because Cavel
exported its entire output to foreign countries and therefore the Amendment
placed some burdens on foreign commerce. 64 The court explained that "an
interference by a state with foreign commerce can complicate the nation's
foreign relations, which are a monopoly of the federal government; states
are not permitted to have their own foreign policy. 6 5 The Court pointed to
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the leading authority on the
Foreign Commerce Clause, 66 which stated "[f]oreign commerce is pre-
eminently a matter of national concern.'6 7 Although the seventh circuit
recognized that at least one Japan Line challenge failed, it continued with
its analysis and concluded that the doctrine from Japan Line would not help
7 Id. at 557.
58 See id.
59 Id.
60Id.
61 Id. (citing Brad Haynes, Zoos in a Pickle over Horse Meat, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 18,
2007, at A], available at NEWSBANK.)
62 See Illinois Horse Meat Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/1.5 (2007).
63 See Cavel, 500 F.3d at 557.
6See Id. at 553.
61 Id. at 558.
66 Id. at 558.
67 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434,449 (1979).
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Cavel because the Court lacked sufficient information to determine the
possible impact on foreign markets.68 The only evidence before the court of
any significance on the issue was a letter written from the foreign minister
of Belgium to the Governor of Illinois concerning the Amendment, and this
letter did not mention any opposition to the legislation.69
The court ultimately concluded that "curtailment of foreign
commerce by the amendment is slight and we are naturally reluctant to
condemn a state law, supported if somewhat tenuously by a legitimate state
interest, on grounds as slight as presented by Cavel. 7° Still, the court
expressed some displeasure in having to uphold a statute that impacted a
foreign-owned export-only company because "the shareholders and
consumers harmed by the amendment have no influence in Illinois
politics."
71
Although this was a direct appeal from the denial of a preliminary
injunction, the court determined that the merits of Cavel's challenge were
adequately presented, and no existing unresolved factual issues remained.
As such, the court treated the appeal as a final judgment and affirmed the
lower court's denial of relief to Cavel.72
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
On June 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court denied Cavel's
petition for writ of certiorari, closing the door on its hope of overturning the
Illinois Amendment.7 3 A similar law was upheld in Texas by the Fifth
Circuit Court; there the two affected slaughterhouses stopped killing horses
and began slaughtering beef along with niche market meats, namely bison
and ostrich.74 Due to the Dekalb slaughterhouse's limited output, it seems
unlikely that Cavel could operate slaughtering cattle. Nor could Cavel
continue to slaughter horses solely for the consumption of zoo animals,
despite Judge Posner's suggestion that this was a potential market for
Cave175. The news article Judge Posner cited in his opinion not only
mentioned that zoos use horse meat, but also that zoos are fearful that the
6 Cavel, 500 F.3d at 558.
69 Id.
70id.
71 id.
72 Id. at 559.
73 Cavel Int'l Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F3d 551 (7"' Cir. 2007), cerl. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2950
(2008).
74 Id. at 552 (discussing Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V., v. Curry, 476 F.3d
326 (5th Cir. 2007)).
71 See id. at 557.
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slaughtering of horses for meat will be federally outlawed and zoos will
have to import most of the horse meat they utilize.76
As legislatures continue to restrict the practice of horse slaughter in
the U.S., the practice appears to have gone to other countries. Following
the closure of the two Texas slaughterhouses, studies indicated that the sale
of American horses intended for slaughter in Mexico rose from 12,000 a
year to 30,000. 77 It is also likely, given the location of the Illinois
slaughterhouse, that the sale of horses for slaughter just moved north of the
border to Canada where horses are not only slaughtered, but eaten.
However, this may become less of an issue as the United States Congress
considers the Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2008, which would
prohibit the possession, transport, sale, delivery, or receiving of a horse or
horse meat in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent that it be used
for human consumption.
78
VI. CONCLUSION
Cavel's facility in Illinois was the last operating slaughterhouse in the
United States producing horse meat for human consumption. In Cavel
International Inc., v. Madigan, 550 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007), the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld an Illinois law which outlawed the
practice. 79 The Court held that the law was not pre-empted by the Federal
Meat Packing Act and was not in violation of the Commerce Clause. ° In
2008, Cavel was forced to close.81 The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
eliminated the possibility of Cavel re-opening in Illinois and if Congress
passes the Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2008, the door on American
edible equine, just like that of the Cavel slaughterhouse, may be
permanently closed.
76 Id. (citing Brad Haynes, Zoos in a Pickle over Horse Meat, SEATTLE TiMEs, Sept. 18,
2007, at AI, available at NEWSBANK).
77 Tony Dokupil, They Shoot Horses, Don't They?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2007, at 86, 87.
7' H.R. REP. No. 110-901. Pt.1, at 2 (2008).
79 CaVel, 500 F.3d at 559.
80 See id. at 558.
Sl See id. at 559.
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